

- 50. PDB
- 51. WH Relations, general
- 52. other CC public affairs
- 53. miscellaneous

(51)

Mr. Helms, Ladies, and Gentlemen, four years ago when I took this position we were still all making great resolutions, which we did not keep. I had a conversation with your director, among the resolutions that were made, not in the presence of your director were ^such things as that I would be anonymous, that I would confine myself to planning and leave operational matters to those who are more experienced, and endless treaties of nonaggression were made between myself and the established bureaucracy. On that occasion the director took me aside and said listen, everything is fine now but wait till the ^{real} problems start. He didn't use the word problems but the latest expression. And he said when that happens you ought to remember that there is one agency in this town that works for the president, that was one treaty that was kept and, therefore, I have had a particularly warm feeling and I'm delighted to be here on this 25th Anniversary. ⁹ I know that your agency comes in for a good deal of criticism ^e among in the more fashionable intellectual quarters these days, primarily among those who haven't the foggiest idea what its job is and how it contributes to the making of national policy. At this time the importance of dispassionate analysis has never been greater. We read daily cables from around the world of what various officials say but we live in a revolutionary period in which conditions are changing rapidly everywhere, and what people say is really much less important than what they mean, and the surface appearances of what one can find in the daily cables are less useful in many respects to us, ^a then an understanding of the trends that they represent. **Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000500050001-8** and therefore, I'm glad to say, to repeat what Mr. Helms has

also pointed out, that I read almost all of your output with the greatest of interest, not always in the most timely fashion, and that the longer and political papers which are less dramatic are sometimes more useful to me than the day to day reports and the day to day intelligence reports. on my side I don't transmit the raw intelligence to the president unless it is , of course, my point of view, but seriously the director and I have an understanding that I read as much of the raw intelligence as my schedule permits but when anything goes to the president it will be ^{an} evaluated report by the agency ^{rather than any} and ~~in~~ isolated pieces that I may pick out or that any other individual agency may pick out and tries to send forward. ^{your} In addition to ~~an~~ analytical work and your daily reports such as the Presidential Brief, Carl Duckett has been conducting a seminar with me trying to educate me ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ the intricacies of the technical development. We have had some tense moments when he didn't tell me what I wanted to hear, but unfortunately for the smooth flow of day to day business you are, at the ~~high~~ heights of your various departments, ~~on~~ men of integrity, so I have to yield most of the time. I did want to say that again these studies have been absolutely ^{al} ~~essentia~~ and without these studies we could not have conducted the various negotiations and I must say, speaking very personally, I could not have conducted those parts of the negotiations such as the final phases of the ^{SALT} ~~SEOU~~ discussions in Moscow in which very rapid decisions had to be taken on the basis of some technical characteristics. It was ^{the first time} many years in which I had the privilege of being exposed to not only the

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000500050001-8

basic facts but the likely developments of the various weapon systems that enables the president and me in ^{his} supporting role to handle that ~~part~~ part of the negotiations that had to be ^{con} confined to Moscow, and then of course there have been your covert services in the rather peculiar way in which we conducted affairs in this administration, which is not described in political science textbooks in which will be very difficult to teach when the ~~day~~ happy day for my colleagues in the state department arrives ~~for~~ when I return to academic pursuit. At any rate this method of operation puts a particular responsibility on many of you, especially your covert services, to help set up my meetings to arrange for communication. I must say, although this obviously cannot be publicized, but without the support of this agency the negotiations that have surfaced and some of those that have not could never have been carried out. ^{so} for all these reasons I'm here to pay tribute to you, to thank those who are responsible for leading this organization as well as all of you who do not receive nearly the public acclaim that you should, ^{but} in addition, beyond all the technical competence, all the debt that I owe you, the president owes you for the specifics, what has impressed us most, what is most useful is the integrity with which the work has been pursued. When we have NSC meetings we can be certain that the briefings of the director will be objective, they do not cater to any of the prevailing notions, they do not tell us necessarily what we want to hear and if any mistakes occur, it is not because we do not have the correct information, it

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000500050001-8

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000500050001-8

is a mistake in our judgement. It is this objectivity, this integrity, it is precisely the opposite of your attempting to influence policy by pursuing your own predilections but to influence policies by making sure that those who have to make the final decision do it by knowing exactly what the implications are according to your best judgement. it has been such a great contribution and therefore, I want ^{you} to know that we wish you well, that we look forward to working with you closely over the years ahead, if the ^{polls} ~~votes~~ are correct, and if the ^{polls} ~~votes~~ should not be correct, and since this administration will come to a end sometime, we can only say that any president will be fortunate to have this organization at his disposal. Thank you.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T01762A000500050001-8

(51)

25X1A

Talk with [REDACTED] at lunch, 12 Sept 72.

25X1A

Subject was mainly the Ops Center's relations with the WH. [REDACTED] said that there is frequently confusion over WH requests because they ^{come} through various channels and it takes a while to determine that the requests are all one and the same. Often it is not clear what is wanted, perhaps because the person who first got the requirement was afraid to ask for clarification. Also, each person forwarding the request draws the deadline tighter.

The requests (for documents, new memos, maps) may come from one of the NSC regional staffs, from Gen. Haig, who is an assistant to Kissinger, or from Tom Latimer, who is an assistant to Gen. Haig. Latimer's requests are probably on ~~his~~ behalf of Gen. Maig most of the time.

25X1A

The requests are run through the WH situation room, and that is where some of the confusion starts. [REDACTED] did not think, however, that the requesters could deal directly with our Ops Center because "things need to run through one center" and the WH situation room needs to be aware of what's being asked for and delivered. (How then, do requests come to us from several different channels?)

25X1A

[REDACTED] currently a watch officer, would be a good person to ask about these matters. He has worked in the WH sit room.

25X1A

[REDACTED] said that on many topics on which OCI writes there is material we don't know about. And the WH has phone contact direct with many important embassies. When there's a problem, lots of business is transacted this way, obviating the need for cables. [REDACTED] wondered then for whom we were writing and why. I said I thought it was for those high officials not engaged in the subject we were treating.

25X1A